Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns
This paper studies optimal decisions in an authorized remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and an authorized third-party remanufacturer with dual-fairness concerns (distributional fairness concerns and peer-induced fairness concerns). Four Stackel...
Published in: | Sustainability (Switzerland) |
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Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI)
2024
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Online Access: | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85204119932&doi=10.3390%2fsu16177609&partnerID=40&md5=3fddcf2f99a6b40e7c937e59c72709d4 |
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2-s2.0-85204119932 Deng Z.; Shaharudin M.R.; Shariff S.S.R.; Tseng M.-L. Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns 2024 Sustainability (Switzerland) 16 17 10.3390/su16177609 https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85204119932&doi=10.3390%2fsu16177609&partnerID=40&md5=3fddcf2f99a6b40e7c937e59c72709d4 This paper studies optimal decisions in an authorized remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and an authorized third-party remanufacturer with dual-fairness concerns (distributional fairness concerns and peer-induced fairness concerns). Four Stackelberg game models are developed: (i) the dual-fairness concerns are considered by the retailer (model F); (ii) the retailer does not consider both types of fairness concerns (model N); (iii) the retailer only considers the distributional fairness concerns (model D); (iv) the retailer only considers the peer-induced fairness concerns (model P). We use numerical analysis to examine the equilibrium outcomes under dual-fairness concerns. The results show that: (1) The increase in the coefficient of peer-induced fairness concerns will result in more profit for the manufacturer in most cases, while distributional fairness concerns always hurt the manufacturer; (2) In most parameter cases, the increase in the degree of distributional fairness concerns favors the retailer. The retailer considers only peer-induced fairness concerns when the degree of distributional fairness concerns is low and the degree of peer-induced fairness concerns is relatively high, whereas in other cases, two kinds of fairness concerns are ignored; (3) Model P is the most profitable and model D is most disadvantageous for the third party, however, for the manufacturer it is the opposite; (4) The impact of fairness concerns on the environment depends on the retailer’s attitude towards fairness concerns. Model P is the best for the environment, while model D has the highest environmental impact. This study introduces dual-fairness concerns into the authorized remanufacturing CLSC model and provides theoretical references for authorized remanufacturing and sustainability practices. © 2024 by the authors. Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI) 20711050 English Article All Open Access; Gold Open Access |
author |
Deng Z.; Shaharudin M.R.; Shariff S.S.R.; Tseng M.-L. |
spellingShingle |
Deng Z.; Shaharudin M.R.; Shariff S.S.R.; Tseng M.-L. Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns |
author_facet |
Deng Z.; Shaharudin M.R.; Shariff S.S.R.; Tseng M.-L. |
author_sort |
Deng Z.; Shaharudin M.R.; Shariff S.S.R.; Tseng M.-L. |
title |
Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns |
title_short |
Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns |
title_full |
Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns |
title_fullStr |
Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns |
title_full_unstemmed |
Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns |
title_sort |
Optimal Decisions in an Authorized Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Dual-Fairness Concerns |
publishDate |
2024 |
container_title |
Sustainability (Switzerland) |
container_volume |
16 |
container_issue |
17 |
doi_str_mv |
10.3390/su16177609 |
url |
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85204119932&doi=10.3390%2fsu16177609&partnerID=40&md5=3fddcf2f99a6b40e7c937e59c72709d4 |
description |
This paper studies optimal decisions in an authorized remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and an authorized third-party remanufacturer with dual-fairness concerns (distributional fairness concerns and peer-induced fairness concerns). Four Stackelberg game models are developed: (i) the dual-fairness concerns are considered by the retailer (model F); (ii) the retailer does not consider both types of fairness concerns (model N); (iii) the retailer only considers the distributional fairness concerns (model D); (iv) the retailer only considers the peer-induced fairness concerns (model P). We use numerical analysis to examine the equilibrium outcomes under dual-fairness concerns. The results show that: (1) The increase in the coefficient of peer-induced fairness concerns will result in more profit for the manufacturer in most cases, while distributional fairness concerns always hurt the manufacturer; (2) In most parameter cases, the increase in the degree of distributional fairness concerns favors the retailer. The retailer considers only peer-induced fairness concerns when the degree of distributional fairness concerns is low and the degree of peer-induced fairness concerns is relatively high, whereas in other cases, two kinds of fairness concerns are ignored; (3) Model P is the most profitable and model D is most disadvantageous for the third party, however, for the manufacturer it is the opposite; (4) The impact of fairness concerns on the environment depends on the retailer’s attitude towards fairness concerns. Model P is the best for the environment, while model D has the highest environmental impact. This study introduces dual-fairness concerns into the authorized remanufacturing CLSC model and provides theoretical references for authorized remanufacturing and sustainability practices. © 2024 by the authors. |
publisher |
Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI) |
issn |
20711050 |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
accesstype |
All Open Access; Gold Open Access |
record_format |
scopus |
collection |
Scopus |
_version_ |
1812871793641259008 |